c1.5 Protect the root account
Avoid day-to-day use of the root user, lock it down with MFA, and — with AWS Organizations — centrally manage or remove root credentials from member accounts so there is far less privileged credential to protect.
Implementation guidance
Avoid using root
The root user has unrestricted access and cannot be constrained by IAM policies, so use it only for the few tasks that truly require it. For everything else use federated, least-privilege access from a centralized identity source. Never create access keys for root — they are durable, unrestricted credentials.
Centrally manage or remove root on member accounts
With AWS Organizations you can centrally manage root access: remove the root user credentials from member accounts entirely, and perform the rare privileged root tasks centrally when needed. This means you only have one root user (the management account) to protect instead of one per account — a large reduction in privileged attack surface. Alternatively, deny root actions on member accounts with AWS Control Tower or an SCP such as:
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "RestrictRootOnMemberAccounts",
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": "*",
"Resource": "*",
"Condition": { "StringLike": { "aws:PrincipalArn": ["arn:aws:iam::*:root"] } }
}
]
}
Protect the root you keep
The management account root is not subject to SCPs, so it needs the strongest protection:
- Enable MFA (now required) — prefer a hardware/FIDO2 device and consider two-person control (one knows the password, another holds the MFA device).
- Never attach access keys to root.
- Alert on every root sign-in (CloudTrail to an SNS notification), since root use should be rare and deliberate.
- Keep the account security contacts current to preserve the recovery path.
How to validate
- Have you centralized root and removed root credentials from member accounts?
- Is anyone using root routinely, or are any access keys configured on a root user?
- How are the remaining root credentials stored (e.g. a vault, hardware MFA, two-person control)?
- Are root actions on member accounts blocked with AWS Control Tower or SCPs?
Threats addressed
- ATT&CK Credential Access an attacker who compromises the contact mailbox may try to reset root passwords to reach your accounts, unless root is centralized/removed or protected with MFA.
- Accountability — frequent shared root use makes it hard for investigators to tell who acted at a given time.
- Root is not least-privilege by definition; routine root use raises the chance those all-powerful credentials are stolen and misused.
AWS services
Framework mappings
AWS CAF
Well-Architected
- waf-security-foundations Security foundations
- waf-identity-and-access-management Identity and access management
Cloud Security Maturity Model